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AbstrAct
Recent International Investment Agreements have incorporated General 
Exceptions similar to GATT Article XX in order to balance the respect of  
National Treatment and protection of  States’ right to regulate. The purpose 
of  this article is to determine if  these exceptions are a suitable choice in 
order to achieve this objective or if  another option would be preferable. 
We first established that General Exceptions are operative exceptions and 
not interpretative statements. This allowed to assess their effect on the in-
terpretation of  national treatment and we managed to prove their poten-
tially detrimental effect on the right to regulate. Then, we searched for other 
means to interpret National Treatment compatible with general exceptions 
but none appears to be really effective in achieving the purpose to balance 
protection of  investments and State’s right to regulate. As a consequence, a 
final study for other treaty wording achieving the stated objective allows to 
conclude that the most suitable choice would be to codify selected arbitral 
award allowing to take into account public policy objectives to determine if  
two investors are in same circumstances, therefore securing the contempla-
ted balance. 
Keywords: International investment law, international investment agree-
ments, international trade law, general exceptions, national treatment, right 
to regulate.
resumo
Os recentes acordos internacionais de investimento incorporaram exce-
ções gerais semelhantes ao artigo XX do GATT com o intuito de equilibrar 
o respeito do Tratamento nacional e a proteção do direito dos Estados de re-
gular. O objetivo deste artigo é determinar se essas exceções são uma esco-
lha adequada para alcançar esse objetivo ou se outra opção seria preferível. 
Primeiro, estabelecemos que as exceções gerais são exceções operacionais 
e não declarações interpretativas. Isso permitiu avaliar seu efeito sobre a 
interpretação do tratamento nacional e conseguimos provar o seu potencial 
efeito prejudicial sobre o direito de regular. Logo, procuramos outros meios 
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para interpretar o Tratamento Nacional de maneira 
compatível com as exceções gerais, mas nenhum parece 
ser realmente efetivo na realização do objetivo de equili-
brar a proteção dos investimentos e o direito do Estado 
de regulamentar. Como consequência, um estudo final 
de outras provisões de tratados alcançando o objetivo 
declarado permite concluir que a escolha mais adequada 
seria codificar determinadas sentenças arbitrais de for-
ma a poder levar em consideração os objetivos de polí-
ticas públicas para determinar se dois investidores estão 
nas mesmas circunstâncias, garantindo assim o previsto 
equilíbrio.
Palavras-chave: exceções gerais; direito de regular; tra-
tamento nacional
1. IntroductIon
National Treatment (NT) has been a central piece in 
both the International Trade Law (ITL) and Internatio-
nal Investment Law (IIL) systems. However, as several 
authors have detailed,1 this standard is applied differen-
tly in these two fields of  International Law. This is due 
to differences in each field’s law making process and 
the concept’s respective purpose and history in each of  
these domains. The differences in application are also 
due to significant differences between Trade and Invest-
ments themselves. 
IIL and ITL have different purposes and organiza-
tions.2 ITL is made to liberalize the streams of  goods 
1 DIMASCIO N. and PAUWELYN J. “Non-discrimination in 
Trade and Investment Treaties: Worlds Apart or Two Sides of  the 
Same Coin?”, 2008, vol.102, n°1 American Journal of  International 
Law, p.48; KURTZ J., “The Use and Abuse of  WTO Law in In-
vestor-State Arbitration: Competition and its Discontents”, 2009, 
vol. 20, n°3 EJIL, p.749; DIEBOLD N., “Non-Discrimination and 
the Pillars of  International Economic Law – Comparative Analysis 
and Building Coherency”, Society for International Economic Law, 
Second Biennial Global Conference, July 8-10 2010, SIEL Working 
Paper No 2010/24, online, SSRN, < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1632927> ; HOWSE R. and CHALAM-
ISH E., “The Use and Abuse of  WTO Law in Investor-State Arbi-
tration: A Reply to Jürgen Kurtz”, 2010, vol.20 n°44 EJIL, p.1087; 
KURTZ J. “The Use and Abuse of  WTO Law in Investor-State 
Arbitration: Competition and its Discontents: A rejoinder to Robert 
Howse and Efraim Chalamish”, 2010, vol. 20, n°4 EJIL, p.1095; 
WEILER T.J., “Treatment No Less Favorable Provisions Within the 
Context of  International Investment Law: “Kindly Please Check 
Your International Trade Law Conceptions at the Door.”, 2014, 
vol.12, n°1, Santa Clara Int’L L., p.77.
2 DIMASCIO N. and PAUWELYN J. supra note 1 at pp.53-8.
and services worldwide by the exchange of  tariff  con-
cessions and other provisions reducing barriers to tra-
de.3 It is governed by a multilateral organization: World 
Trade Organisation (WTO). It is enforced by a multi-
lateral mechanism, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB) which can authorize retaliation by one state on 
another. Disputes are therefore only State-to-State dis-
putes. As Pauwelyn and DiMascio summarize: “the tra-
de regime is about overall welfare, efficiency, liberali-
zation, state-to-state exchanges of  market access, and 
trade opportunities - not individual rights”.4 
Meanwhile, IIL has a different objective, it provides 
protection to investors that are present5 in the territory 
of  the other contracting State. These investors can get 
enforcement of  these protection through Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement (ISDS) provided for in most of  the 
more than 3,000 International Investment Agreements 
(IIAs) currently in force. These arbitral mechanisms can 
make the host state liable for reparation if  the investor 
has suffered losses from a breach of  the protections 
provided for in the agreement by the host State. 
Therefore, while ITL is headed to liberalize the ex-
change of  goods and services worldwide, IIL is made to 
protect and give more predictability to investors from 
both parties by granting them rights in the territory of  
the other Party. These differences have consequences 
on NT provisions and analysis under both regimes.
Because of  the differences of  purpose between ITL 
and IIL, NT has also different objectives in each of  the-
se regimes. NT in the ITL frame has a double role6. 
3 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, TIAS 
No. 1700, 55 UNTS 194 [hereinafter GATT], The Preamble of  the 
GATT of  1947 exposes this liberalization purpose: “entering into 
reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the 
substantial reduction of  tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the 
elimination of  discriminatory treatment in international commerce” 
(para. 3), being a way to “raising standards of  living, ensuring full 
employment and a large and steadily growing volume of  real income 
and effective demand, developing the full use of  the resources of  
the world and expanding the production and exchange of  goods” 
(para. 2).
4 DIMASCIO N. and PAUWELYN J. supra note 1 at p.54.
5 In some treaties, NT also applies to investors that are seeking to 
invest in the host State. These treaties apply NT pre-establishment 
by referring to establishment and acquisition in the list of  operations 
covered by the clause. This has been mainly found in treaties by 
Canada and the United States: See DOLZER R. and SCHREUER 
C., Principles of  International Investment Law, 2nd edition, 2012, Oxford : 
Oxford University Press, at p. 89.
6 DIMASCIO N. and PAUWELYN J., supra note 1, at pp.59-60 ; 
KURTZ J. “The Use and Abuse of  WTO Law in Investor-State Ar-
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First, it prevents States from reducing the value of  their 
tariff  concessions by the use of  internal restrictions. 
Second, it prevents protectionism, as described by the 
Appellate Body (AB): 
“The broad and fundamental purpose of  Article III 
is to avoid protectionism in the application of  internal 
tax and regulatory measures. More specifically, the pur-
pose of  Article III “is to ensure that internal measures 
‘not be applied to imported or domestic products so as 
to afford protection to domestic production’”7
The purpose of  NT in IIL is different. This provi-
sion is part of  several protections provided to the inves-
tor. At first, it was not the most significant one. Indeed, 
in the 1960’s, when the first IIAs were concluded, there 
was an opposition between developing and developed 
countries. The first ones, mostly importers of  invest-
ments, relied on Carlos Calvo’s doctrine and wanted to 
afford only “National Treatment” to foreign investors.8 
Developed States, hence, integrated in the first BITs ab-
solute protections as the principle of  compensation for 
expropriation and Fair and Equitable Treatment. Their 
idea was that a minimum standard of  treatment existed 
towards foreign investors, even if  the host states did 
not provide such treatment to its own nationals. The-
refore, NT was in the first place seen as a minimal pro-
tection. However, with the conclusion of  IIAs between 
developed States since NAFTA9 and the higher level of  
treatment accorded to national investors in developed 
States, NT has become a more prominent standard and 
allows to create a level playing field.10 
These different objectives resulted in different treaty 
wordings and interpretations. 
IIAs usually contain a NT provision as follows:
“Each Party shall accord to investors of  another 
Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, 
in like circumstances, to its own investors with respect 
to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, manage-
ment, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition 
bitration: Competition and its Discontents”, supra note 1, at p.753.
7 Appellate Body Report, Japan- Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (here-
inafter Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II), WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/ 
AB/R, & WT/DS 11 /AB/R, adopted November 1, 1996, at p.17.
8 CALVO C., Derecho Internacional Teorico y Practico de Europa y 
America, 1868.
9 North American Free Trade Agreement, Signed on December 
17, 1992, Entered into force on January 1, 1994, vol. 32, ILM, p.605.
10 DIMASCIO N. and PAUWELYN J., supra note 1, at pp.67-8.
of  investments.”11
NT has been interpreted by arbitral tribunals throu-
gh a three-step analysis. First, tribunals look for the exis-
tence of  “like circumstances”. While doing this analysis, 
most tribunals have required the national investor and 
the foreign investor to be in a competitive relationship.12
Second, the investor has to bring the proof  that it 
has received a less favorable treatment than an investor 
in like circumstances.13
Third, if  there has been a “less favorable treatment”, 
the State has the possibility to bring the proof  that the 
difference of  treatment is justified by a legitimate policy 
objective. Such an objective would exclude the fact that 
the National Investor and the foreign one are in like circu-
mstances and as a consequence exclude a breach of  NT.14
NT in ITL is based on a different treaty language 
and has received a different interpretation by the AB 
of  the WTO. 
NT is embodied in GATT (General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade) Article III. Article III.4 provides that:
“The products of  the territory of  any contracting 
party imported into the territory of  any other contrac-
ting party shall be accorded treatment no less favoura-
ble than that accorded to like products of  national ori-
gin in respect of  all laws, regulations and requirements 
affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, 
transportation, distribution or use.”
Contrary to the provisions present in most IIAs, Ar-
ticle III.1 provides for an indication on the purpose of  
the NT provision:
“The contracting parties recognize that internal 
11 NAFTA, supra note 8, Article 1102 (1). Article 1102 (2) pro-
vides the same treatment for investments of  the investors. 
12 SD Myers v Canada, First Partial Award, November 13, 2000, 
ICSID Reports, vol.8, p.18 at para. 250; Pope and Talbot v. Canada, 
Award on the Merits of  Phase 2, April 10, 2001, ICSID Reports, 
vol.7, p.102 at para. 78; Feldman v. Mexico, Award, December 16, 
2002, ICSID Reports, vol.7, p.341 at para. 171; ADF v. United States, 
Award, January 9, 2003, at para. 155; Archer Daniels Midland v. Mexico, 
Award, November 21, 2007, at paras. 196-8; Corn Products v. Mexico, 
Decision on responsibility, January 15, 2008, at para.120.
13 Pope and Talbot v. Canada, supra note 11, at para 42 ; Feldman v. 
Mexico, supra note 11, at 173 ; Archer Daniels Midland, supra note 11, 
at para. 196.
14 Pope and Talbot, supra note 11, at para 78 ; SD Myers v Canada, 
supra note 11, at para 246 ; Marvin Roy Feldman v Mexico, Award, supra 
note 11, at para 184 ; GAMI v Mexico, Award, November 15, 2005, 
ICSID Report, vol.13, p.147, at para 114. 
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taxes and other internal charges, and laws, regulations 
and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering 
for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of  
products, and internal quantitative regulations requiring 
the mixture, processing or use of  products in specified 
amounts or proportions, should not be applied to im-
ported or domestic products so as to afford protection to 
domestic production.” (emphasis added)
The interpretation has therefore been different 
compared to the one developed in IIL. It consists of  
three steps. 
First, there is to identify what is the scope of  “like pro-
ducts”. This operation is based on a competitive analysis.15 
The AB has rejected the possibility to take into account a 
legitimate objective while determining the scope of  “like 
products”.16 This is a rejection of  an “aim and effect” 
analysis, an interpretation of  “so as to afford protection” 
requiring an intention to discriminate from the State.17 
This interpretation is based on the textual differences be-
tween Article III.2 and article III.4 and the presence of  
GATT Article XX General Exceptions (GE), that would 
have made this approach redundant.18
The “so as to afford protection” part of  Article III:1 
has eventually been interpreted as requiring the measure 
to have the effect to treat imported products less favo-
rably than the national ones.19 This is taken into account 
in the second phase of  the analysis: the establishment 
of  a “less favorable treatment”, by comparing the treat-
ment accorded to the whole group of  imported pro-
ducts to the one granted to the whole group of  national 
products.20
The legitimate objectives are taken into account du-
ring a third step, under GATT Article XX, that contains 
an exhaustive list of  purposes and conditions. Such ex-
15 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Af-
fecting Asbestos (hereinafter EC – Asbestos), WT/DS135/R, adopted 
April 5, 2001, at para. 99.
16 Appellate Body Report, Japan –Beverages II, supra note 6, at 27-8. 
17 HUDEC, R.E. “GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regu-
lation: Requiem for an “Aim and Effects” Test”, 1998, vol.32, n°3 
The International Lawyer, p.619, at pp.632-3.
18 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 
15, at 28-31.
19 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports 
of  Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef  (hereinafter Korea – Beef), WT/
DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, adopted January 10, 2001, at 
paras. 135-7.
20 Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, supra note 14, at para. 
115
ceptions do not exist in IIL.
However, with the development of  a growing con-
cern about the preservation of  a regulatory space for 
the host State, several treaties and model Bilateral In-
vestment Treaties (BITs) have incorporated a GE clau-
se either identical or similar to GATT21 Article XX.22 
This move has been started by Canada since 1994 and 
incorporated in its 2004 Model BIT.23 If  it is not wides-
pread, GE have been recently included in each of  the 
EU’s IIAs24, including in its proposal for the investment 
chapter of  the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Par-
tnership (TTIP)25 that will serve as a pattern for its fu-
ture IIAs negotiations26. This appropriation by the EU 
21 Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT), 
Canadian FIPA Model, 20 May 2004, Article 10, online, Italaw < 
http://www.italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-
en.pdf  >; Final CETA (Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement) Text, released February 29, 2016, online: European 
Commission < http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/feb-
ruary/tradoc_154329.pdf  >.
22 NEWCOMBE A., “The use of  general exceptions in IIAs: 
increasing legitimacy or uncertainty?”, in LÉVESQUE C. and DE 
MESTRAL A. (eds.), Improving International Investment Agreements, 
2013, New York: Routledge, p.267, at p.268.
23 LEVESQUE C., “The Challenges of  ‘Marrying’ Investment 
Liberalisation and Protection in the Canada-EU CETA” in BUN-
GENBERG M., REINISCH A. and TIETJE C., EU and Investment 
Agreements – Open Questions and Remaining Challenges, Hart Publishing, 
2012, p.121, at p.139.
24 EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement – Authentic text as of  
May 2015, negotiations concluded 14 October 2014, online, Euro-
pean Commission: <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.
cfm?id=961>, Article 9.3§3; Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement between Canada, of  the one part, and EU and its Mem-
ber States, on the other, online, European Union Council, <http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/10/28-
eu-canada-trade-agreement/>, Article 28.3; EU-Vietnam Free 
Trade Agreement, Agreed text as of  January 2016, online, Euro-
pean Commission, <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.
cfm?id=1437>, Part on Trade in Services, Investment and e-Com-
merce, Chapter VII.
25 European Commission, Draft text of  TTIP Chapter II Invest-
ments, 12 June 2015, online, European Commission, <http://trade.
ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1364>, to be read jointly 
with the whole proposal of  the Commission regarding TTIP, Chap-
ter VII, Article 7.1.
26 European Commission, Concept paper “Investment in TTIP 
and beyond - the path for reform Enhancing the right to regulate 
and moving from current ad hoc arbitration towards an Investment 
Court”, 12 May 2015, online, European Commission, <chrome-
extension://oemmndcbldboiebfnladdacbdfmadadm/http://trade.
ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153408.PDF>, 
at p.4. For studies on the IIA model of  the EU, see HERVE A., 
“L’Union européenne comme acteur émergent du droit des in-
vestissements étrangers : pour le meilleur ou pour le pire?”, CDE, 
2015, pp. 179-234; TITI C., “International Investment Law and the 
European Union: Towards a New Generation of  International In-
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may spread such clauses, due to its growing prominent 
position and influence in IIL.27
In the treaties incorporating such exceptions, a new 
scheme is created, similar to the one existing between 
GATT Articles III and XX. Considering the differen-
ces between the two regimes described above, questions 
arise from the impact of  these exceptions on the inter-
pretation of  NT in IIL, which could go against the very 
purpose of  the inclusion of  this type of  provisions: ba-
lancing the governments’ right to regulate and the pro-
tection of  foreign investors. 
To address these interrogations, this article first de-
monstrates that GE are operative exceptions and not 
interpretative statements (Part I), and that their inclu-
sion may have consequences on the interpretation of  
NT in IIL, requiring to adopt mainly competitive analy-
sis (Part II). Therefore, there is to find possibilities to 
interpret NT that permit to fill the gaping loophole for 
legitimate policy objectives (Part III). Even with these 
interpretations, it would be better to find other ways to 
achieve the same objective while drafting IIAs (Part IV).
2. generAl exceptIons Are operAtIve 
exceptIons And not InterpretAtIve 
stAtements
Authors have followed two different ways in discus-
sing the consequences of  the integration of  GATT Ar-
ticle XX like Exceptions in the IIAs. On the one hand, 
some of  them have described these as being interpreta-
tive statements that only inform the meaning of  other 
provisions, without having much effect on NT itself.28 
vestment Agreements, 2015, vol. 26, n°3, EJIL, p. 639; GUICH-
ARD-SULGER B., “Le nouveau modèle européen d’accords 
portant sur l’investissement étranger : Un modèle singulier et in-
novant?”, Geneva Jean Monnet Working Paper, 2016, n°26/2016, 
online, CEJE, <http://www.ceje.ch/index.php/download_file/
view/462/2714/>.
27 DE MESTRAL A., “The Evolving Role of  the European Un-
ion in IIA treaty-making”, in LÉVESQUE C. and DE MESTRAL 
A. (eds.), Improving International Investment Agreements, 2013, New 
York: Routledge, p.42; TITI C., supra note 26, at p. 661; CHAUVEL 
L.-M., “Normative Inlfuence of  the European Union in the Field of  
International Investment Law, 2017, forthcoming; 
28 SABANOGULLARI L., ‘The Merits and Limitations of  Gen-
eral Exception Clauses in Contemporary Investment Treaty Prac-
tice’, May 21 2015, Online: Investment Treaty News < https://www.
iisd.org/itn/2015/05/21/the-merits-and-limitations-of-general-
exception-clauses-in-contemporary-investment-treaty-practice/ >, 
On the other hand, some others have considered these 
exceptions as restricted and operative exceptions, there-
fore having effects on the interpretation of  NT.29 
We consider that GE in the shape of  GATT Arti-
cle XX cannot be seen as “interpretative statements”. 
Some IIAs have incorporated interpretative statements 
as a way to encourage the general policy objectives to be 
taken into account in the application and interpretation 
of  IIAs provisions, such as NT. For Instance, NAFTA 
Article 1114 (1) provides that:
“Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to pre-
vent a Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing 
any measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that 
it considers appropriate to ensure that investment acti-
vity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive 
to environmental concerns.”
This kind of  interpretative statements are very diffe-
rent from the GE in the shape of  GATT Article XX. 
GATT Article XX like exceptions have two specifici-
ties. First, they allow to exclude a breach of  NT if  the 
contested measure is necessary to achieve a closed list 
of  public purposes.30 These objectives are core values 
taken into account otherwise in IIAs as possible excep-
tions to the liability of  the State. Indeed, protection of  
health and environment are considered as “Legitima-
te Public Welfare Objectives” excluding the existence 
of  an expropriation even if  a regulatory measure has 
wholly deprived the investor of  its investment.31 
Second, their application is conditioned by the re-
quirements of  the “chapeau”, providing: 
“Subject to the requirement that such measures are 
not applied in a manner which would constitute a means 
of  arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a dis-
Accessed on 29 May 2017.
29 LEVESQUE C., “Influences of  the Canadian FIPA Model 
and the US Model BIT : NAFTA Chapter 11 and Beyond”, 2006, 
vol.44, Can. Y.B. Int’l L., p.249; LEVESQUE C., “The Inclusion of  
GATT Article XX exceptions in IIAs: a potentially risky policy”, in 
ECHANDI E. and SAUVÉ P., eds., Prospects in International Investment 
Law and Policy Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, p.363; 
NEWCOMBE A., supra note 21.
30 For instance, Canadian FIPA Model of  2004, supra note 20, 
at Article 10 (1) allows “measures necessary: (a) to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health; (b) to ensure compliance with laws 
and regulations that are not inconsistent with the provisions of  this 
Agreement; or (c) for the conservation of  living or non-living ex-
haustible natural resources”.
31 Ibid., Annex B.13(1). 
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guised restriction on international trade, nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption 
or enforcement by any contracting party of  measures”32
Therefore, it appears that, by conditioning the ex-
ceptions implemented to protect the most core objec-
tives of  Public Policy according to IIAs, it establishes a 
new scheme in the interpretation of  NT. The provision 
on NT becomes the rule and the exceptions are speci-
fically laid down in a separate provision. The difference 
with interpretative statements has to be found there. 
Interpretative statements inform the interpretation of  
provisions, such as NT, to take into account some po-
licy objectives. It is still possible to interpret the provi-
sions more broadly, to take into account other interests. 
Otherwise, GE require that the interpretation given 
of  NT do not deprive them of  their utility, by making 
them redundant.33 Indeed, following the principle of  
effectiveness in treaty interpretation in International law, 
a treaty provision cannot be interpreted in a way that 
would deprive it of  its utility, except if  doing otherwise 
would go against the purpose of  the treaty.34 
The fact that the NT should be interpreted differen-
tly when Article XX like exceptions are incorporated 
in the Agreement has also been highlighted by Invest-
ment rulings. In the SD Myers award, the tribunal has 
found that the absence of  GE in NAFTA Chapter 11 
informed the way to interpret the NT provision itself. 35 
While incorporating these exceptions in IIAs, the State 
Parties knew this interpretation. Therefore, the inten-
tion of  the Parties are not to consider that GE are mere 
informative statements but standing operative excep-
tions to the NT Provision. 
Hence, the inclusion of  GE in IIAs requires that 
the criteria taken into account while determining the 
32 GATT, supra note 3, Article XX.
33 LEVESQUE C., “The Inclusion of  GATT Article XX excep-
tions in IIAs: a potentially risky policy”, supra note 23, at p.366. 
34 DAILLIER P., FORTEAU M. and PELLET A., Droit inter-
national public, 8th edition, 2009, Paris: LGDJ, at pp.288-289. Inter-
preting NT in a way that would not deprive GE of  their utility and 
therefore restricting the possibility of  taking into account legitimate 
policy objectives would not go against the purpose of  II As, which 
is often stated as follows: “Recognizing that the promotion and the 
protection of  investments of  investors of  one Party in the territory 
of  the other Party will be conducive to the stimulation of  mutually 
beneficial business activity, to the development of  economic coop-
eration between them and to the promotion of  sustainable develop-
ment”, for the example of  the Canada Model BIT (2004), inviting to 
interpret exceptions narrowly.
35 SD Myers v Canada, supra note 11, at para 246.
existence of  a breach of  NT do not have the effect to 
deprive them of  their utility and objective in the Agree-
ment. The analysis will then focus on the criteria taken 
into account by several arbitral tribunals to determine if  
they may deprive the GE of  their useful effect. 
3. the consequences on the InterpretAtIon 
of nAtIonAl treAtment : A competItIve 
AnAlYsIs of the “sAme cIrcumstAnces” 
crIterIon
While interpreting the NT provision, an arbitral tri-
bunal mainly takes into account three factors: legitimate 
policy objectives (A), nationality (B) of  the investor and 
competitive relationship (C). The integration of  GE will 
tend to reduce drastically the importance of  the two first 
criteria, resulting in a mainly competitive analysis of  NT.
3.1. A Drastic Diminution of the Role 
of Legitimate Policy Objectives in the 
Determination of “Like Circumstances”
As described earlier, in the determination of  a brea-
ch of  NT, Tribunals have taken into account the objec-
tive of  the measure as part of  the analysis of  “like circu-
mstances”. Indeed, once a less favorable treatment has 
been shown, the burden of  proof  shifts. The State has 
then to demonstrate that this treatment is based on a 
“legitimate policy objective”. 36 This would then allow to 
exclude the existence of  “like circumstances” between a 
national investor and the foreign investor.37 
Tribunals have admitted a very broad range of  legiti-
mate policy objectives. In the GAMI award, the tribunal 
has admitted the objective of  “ensuring that the sugar 
industry was in the hands of  solvent enterprises”.38 In 
Pope and Talbot, the relevant objective was “to implement 
36 Arbitral tribunals have used different languages but have con-
sistently taken these objectives into account: Pope and Talbot, Award 
on the Merits of  Phase 2, supra note 11, at para 78 : « reasonable 
nexus to rational government policies” ; SD Myers v Canada, supra 
note 11, at para 246 : “legitimate policy measures that are pursued 
in a reasonable manner”; Marvin Roy Feldman v Mexico, Award, supra 
note 11 , at para 184, rely on the analysis developed by the tribunal 
in Pope and Talbot; GAMI v Mexico, supra note 13 , at para 114: “that 
measure was plausibly connected with a legitimate goal of  policy”. 
37 The whole analysis is described by the tribunal in Pope and Tal-
bot, supra note 11, at paras 78-9.
38  GAMI v Mexico, supra note 13, at para 114.
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the SLA”39 The SLA (Soft Lumber Agreement) was an 
1996 Agreement between the United States of  America 
(USA) and Canada to solve a trade dispute.40 
Moreover, Tribunals have not required a stringent 
standard of  effectiveness from the State concerning 
the means to achieve its objective. The tribunal in the 
GAMI case have admitted that: 
“The Government may have been misguided. That 
is a matter of  policy and politics. The Government may 
have been clumsy in its analysis of  the relevant criteria 
for the cutoff  line between candidates and non-candi-
dates for expropriation. Its understanding of  corporate 
finance may have been deficient. But ineffectiveness is 
not discrimination.”41 
This analysis of  “like circumstances” in the NT pro-
vision seems to be inconsistent with the introduction of  
GE. As a matter of  fact, a measure by a state that would 
have been found in breach of  National Treatment in-
terpreted this way could not meet the requirements of  
GATT Article XX like exceptions. Such a measure would 
not have been justified by any policy objective interpreted 
much more broadly than the closed list provided for in 
GATT Article XX. Moreover, it would not have met the 
only requirement of  effectiveness described in the GAMI 
award: not to be per se discriminatory. Thus, it is more than 
unlikely that this measure could enter into the scope of  the 
GE, as it would certainly neither pursue one of  the objec-
tives listed nor meet the requirement of  “necessity” and 
the conditions of  the chapeau. In conclusion, to take into 
account legitimate policy objectives under the analysis of  
“like circumstances” as described above would make the 
GE useless and would go against the principle of  effecti-
veness in treaty interpretation as described above. 
However, legitimate policy objectives could still be 
taken into account, although in a much more restric-
tive way. Lévesque suggests to rely on the decision of  
the AB in the EC – Asbestos case.42 In this decision, the 
AB has considered it relevant to take into account cri-
teria such as health risk in the analysis of  the existen-
ce of  “like products”, but only to the extent that the 
health risk was relevant to “[assess] the competitive 
39 Pope and Talbot v Canada, supra note 11, at para 103.
40 Ibid., at para 18.
41 GAMI v Mexico, supra note 13, at para 114.
42 LEVESQUE C., “Influences of  the Canadian FIPA Model and 
the US Model BIT : NAFTA Chapter 11 and Beyond”, supra note 
23, at p.275.
relationship in the marketplace between allegedly like 
products”.43 Otherwise, it is taken into account in the 
context of  GE as “a sufficient basis for “adopting or 
enforcing” a WTO-inconsistent measure on the groun-
ds of  human health”.44 In the context of  investments, 
this finding could be broaden from “like products” to 
“like circumstances”. The risk affecting the competitive 
relationship could be due to the investment as a who-
le and not only to the items produced by the investor. 
However, the difference, for example in the polluting 
characteristics of  the enterprise and the production, 
should affect the competition between a foreign inves-
tor and a national investor itself  and not only require to 
take measures to protect the environment, such as rules 
on the management of  specific wastes. Therefore, the 
line separating a health or environmental risk affecting 
competitive relationship and those serving as basis for a 
measure according to GATT Article XX like exceptions 
could be blurry. 
To conclude, except for the circumstances where 
a factual differentiation is to be taken into account as 
affecting the competition relationship between two in-
vestors, legitimate policy objectives may not be taken 
into account in the determination of  a breach of  NT 
when GE are incorporated in the agreement as it would 
deprive those of  their useful effect. Another conse-
quence of  the integration of  such exceptions may be 
to restrain the role assigned to the nationality criterion.
3.2. The Incertitude on the Role of Nationality
The addition of  GE questions the role of  the na-
tionality criterion in the determination of  a breach of  
NT. Indeed, to take it into account while determining 
“like circumstances” would deprive these exceptions of  
their “effet utile” or useful effect (1) and taking it into 
account in the assessment of  the existence of  a “less 
favorable treatment” is ill-adapted to IIL (2).
3.2.1. The Impossibility to take into account 
Nationality While Determining the Existence of 
“Like Circumstances”. 
Most ISDS Tribunals consider the nationality of  the 
investor as a criterion for the determination of  “like cir-
43 EC – Asbestos, supra note 14, at para 115.
44 Ibid. 
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cumstances”. They have done so in two different ways. 
First, some tribunals take the nationality of  the in-
vestor into account while assessing the existence of  a 
“legitimate policy objective”. This objective is conside-
red as a proof  that the less favorable treatment lies on 
another basis than the nationality of  the investor.45 
Second, tribunals have considered that “like circu-
mstances” would require the use of  the closest national 
comparator available.46 That means a comparator that 
would be in the exact same circumstances as the foreign 
investor but for their nationality.47 If  there is no national 
identical comparator, these tribunals have accepted to 
use the same analysis as the one described above.48 
These two ways, in fact, end in the same result. In-
deed, foreign investors are only found “in like circums-
tances” with a national investor if  there is no other di-
fference between them than their nationality. 
Thus, this use of  nationality is inconsistent with 
GE. Indeed, a measure that would have been found in 
breach of  the NT would have imposed “less favorable 
treatment” to a foreign investor than to a national in-
vestor in the exact same circumstances except for their 
nationality. Therefore, there would be no factual basis 
that could justify a difference of  treatment under the 
requirements of  GATT Article XX like exceptions. For 
instance, it would not be possible to justify a differential 
treatment as necessary to protect public health if  the 
two investors are in the exact same circumstances, the 
activity of  one of  them being no more dangerous than 
the activity of  the other. 
Therefore, this use of  the criterion of  nationality is 
45 Pope and Talbot v Canada, supra note 11, at para 78: “Differences 
in treatment will presumptively violate Article 1102(2), unless they 
have a reasonable nexus to rational government policies that (1) do 
not distinguish, on their face or de facto, between foreign-owned 
and domestic companies.”; GAMI v Mexico, supra note 13, at para 
215: the analysis of  the tribunal searches to determine if  the differ-
ence of  treatment was based on the nationality of  the investors, as 
it concludes: “that GAMI has failed to demonstrate that the meas-
ures it invokes ‘resulted from or have any connection to GAMI’s 
participation in GAM; nor were they geared towards treating GAM 
in a different mode because of  GAMI’s participation in their social 
capital’” knowing that GAMI was a foreign shareholder of  GAM; 
Marvin Roy Feldman v Mexico, supra note 11, the decision relies on the 
findings or the Pope and Talbot award, at para 184.
46 KURTZ J., supra note 1, at pp.765-9.
47 Methanex v United States, Award, August 3, 2005, ILM, vol.44, 
p.1345, at para.17 ; Archer Daniel Midlands v Mexico, supra note XXX, 
at 202. 
48 Ibid.
not compatible with the inclusion of  GATT Article XX 
like exceptions and two investors may be “in like circu-
mstances” even if  they have other differences than their 
sole nationality.
As a consequence, any difference of  treatment, even 
if  it were not based on the nationality of  the foreign in-
vestor, could amount to a breach of  NT. Another pos-
sible way to understand the nationality criterion would 
be to rely on ITL, that takes into account nationality in 
the analysis of  the “less favorable treatment”.  
3.2.2. The Role of Nationality in the Determina-
tion of the Existence of a “Less Favorable Treat-
ment”. 
In ITL, nationality has been taken into account in a 
different way. Once the existence of  “like products” has 
been identified, “a complaining Member must still esta-
blish that the measure accords to the group of  “like” 
imported products “less favourable treatment” than it 
accords to the group of  “like” domestic products”.49 
This analysis would not make GE without object as 
demonstrates its use in a GATT context but it seems, 
however, very unsatisfactory in an IIL context in three 
aspects: it is based on one of  the main differences be-
tween ITL and IIL NT provisions; it is not adapted to 
situations in which the claimant is an individual; and 
would also be very unsatisfactory for the host State. 
First, the analysis of  nationality in ITL is based on 
the requirements of  Article III (1) that the less favora-
ble treatment must be accorded “so as to afford protec-
tion to domestic production”.50 Meanwhile, IIAs do not 
contain such requirement. Therefore, there is no textual 
basis to justify such an analysis as a requirement to find 
a breach of   NT in IIL.51 It has been used, however, in 
the Corn Products case.52 As a consequence, even if  this 
analysis is not mandated by the provision on NT, some 
tribunals could decide to rely on it if  the nationality of  
the investor could not be taken into account otherwise.
Second, even if  this analysis were applied, it would 
have many disadvantages for the investor in an IIL con-
text because of  the mere characteristics of  investment 
49 EC – Asbestos, supra note 14, at para 100.
50 Ibid.
51 WEILER T.J., supra note 1 at p.102; KURTZ J., supra note 1, 
at p.753.
52 Corn Products v Mexico, supra note 11, at paras 132 and 138.
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compared to trade and because the claimant is a private 
person. 
The proof  that the overall group of  foreign pro-
ducts has been treated less favorably than the group of  
national products is quite easy to make. The nationality 
of  products is determined by detailed rules of  origin, 
and the volumes of  exchanged goods is recorded by 
customs officials. The situation is different for invest-
ments. Indeed, once the scope of  investors “in like cir-
cumstances” has been established, the investor will have 
to distinguish between national and foreign investors. 
But, the establishment of  the nationality of  an investor 
or an investment is difficult to make, as it can rely on 
different methodologies, as the nationality of  sharehol-
ders, the incorporation of  the enterprise or the place of  
the main seat.53 
Then, the investor would have to bring the proof  
that the less favorable treatment has had a more impor-
tant impact on foreign investors as a whole than on the 
group of  National investors. Moreover, the question 
may be to know if  this disproportion has to be deter-
mined on a proportion of  the number of  investors of  
each group, by a proportion of  the overall production 
or even of  the total income. These proofs also appear 
very difficult to make. 
Furthermore, in IIL, the claims are brought by an 
investor and not by a State. This difference adds to the 
difficulties to bring the proof  of  a difference of  treat-
ment based on nationality in the analysis of  the “less 
favorable treatment”. Indeed, States dispose of  large 
internal services with competence in Economy or Tra-
de issues that make them able to conduct the type of  
analysis described above and necessary to bring a proof  
of  a disproportionate impact on foreign investors or 
products. Moreover, as members of  several Interna-
tional organizations, they have access to shared infor-
mation, facilitating to gather the elements to prove the 
disproportion.54 Investors, conversely, do not have such 
resources and it would make it even more difficult for 
them to bring the required proofs.
The tribunal in the Pope and Talbot case has taken into 
account the preceding arguments and therefore rejected 
this analysis in IIL: 
53 DOLZER R. and SCHREUER C., supra note 5, at p.47. 
54 KURTZ J., “The Use and Abuse of  WTO Law in Investor-
State Arbitration: Competition and its Discontents”, supra note 1, 
at pp.757-8.
“Simply to state this approach is to show how 
unwieldy it would be and how it would hamstring fo-
reign owned investments seeking to vindicate their Ar-
ticle 1102 rights. Only in the simplest and most obvious 
cases of  denial of  national treatment could the complai-
nant hope to make a case for recovery. The Tribunal is 
unwilling to take a step that would so weaken the pro-
visions and objectives of  NAFTA and, for the reasons 
stated, rejects Canada’s disproportionate disadvantage 
test.”55
However, this approach has been followed in the 
Corn Products award.56 In this case, the claimant was suc-
cessful to prove the existence of  a breach of   NT. But, 
the particular conditions of  this case seem to amount to 
“the simplest and most obvious cases of  denial of  na-
tional treatment” referred to by the Tribunal in the Pope 
and Talbot award. In the case of  Corn Products, the two 
industries, HFCS producers and Cane sugar producers 
were, for one, totally nationally owned and the other 
totally owned by foreign investors.57 Moreover, a WTO 
panel had found that the contentious measure was dis-
criminatory, as it imposed a tax for the use of  HFCS 
in soft drinks whereas such a tax did not exist for cane 
sugar.58 This measure was intentionally discriminatory 
as it was a countermeasure against the United States.59 
This may have been much more difficult for the in-
vestor to prove if  there had been no WTO Panel deci-
sion on discriminatory intent. In the same way, if  the 
two industries had been partially owned by foreign and 
national investors, if  an investor had produced both 
products or if  an enterprise had been owned both by 
national and foreign shareholders, to bring a proof  of  a 
disproportionate disadvantage for the foreign investors 
would have been much more challenging. 
Moreover, as noted by Pauwelyn and DiMascio, the-
re would be no difference of  treatment if  the investor 
was the only foreign investor to receive less favorable 
treatment. He would indeed need to demonstrate that 
the measure affects most of  the foreign investors.60
This analysis of  nationality under the requirement 
55 Pope and Talbot v Canada, supra note 11, at para 72.
56 Corn Products v Mexico, supra note 11, at paras 132-42. 
57 Ibid., at para 132.
58 Ibid., at para 47: Mexico - Tax Measures on «Soft Drinks» and Other 
Beverages, WT/DS308/AB/R, released on March 6, 2006 (Report 
cited in the award).
59 Ibid., at para 137.
60 DIMASCIO N. and PAUWELYN J., supra note 1, at p.82.
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of  a “less favorable treatment” is also unsatisfactory 
for the host State. In ITL, a measure that accords less 
favorable treatment to the group of  foreign products 
than to the group of  national like products is consi-
dered as being discriminatory. This is justified by the 
fact that an import of  goods is considered by the states 
as being more “negative” and they have incentives to 
put barriers to reduce these imports.61 Therefore, the 
same analysis in IIL would mean that measures treating 
less favorably foreign investments than national ones, 
are presumed to be discriminatory treatment. However, 
the range of  measures that apply to investors is way 
more important than those applied to products and as 
a consequence there might be a more important variety 
of  justifications to accord a differential treatment. In 
addition, imports of  investments are often seen as po-
sitive by the states as they provide jobs, cash flows, tax 
revenues, therefore it is more difficult to assume that 
the difference of  treatment can be presumed as discri-
minatory.62 
To take into account the nationality of  the investor 
in the determination of  “less favorable treatment” in a 
similar way than it is done in ITL would not deprive GE 
of  their utility. However, there is no treaty basis to use 
this possibility and it would have, as described above, 
many side effects for both the investor and the State. 
Tribunals, while taking a decision on NT in a treaty 
containing GE, would have a choice between two unsa-
tisfying options as to take into account nationality as a 
basis for the less favorable treatment. First, they could 
choose not to take into account the nationality of  the 
investor in the analysis of  a breach of  NT otherwise 
than to know if  the claimant is entitled to bring a claim 
under the agreement. Secondly, they could take it into 
account in a similar way than in ITL, which reveals to 
have major side effects and to be ill-adapted to IIL. 
Therefore, the understanding of  “same circumstances” 
should be mainly focused on a competition relationship.
3.3. The Compatibility of a Competitive Analysis
Although a competitive analysis between the foreign 
investor and its domestic comparator is not required in 
IIL according to treaty wording,63 it has been consisten-
61 Ibid., at 81-2. 
62 Ibid.
63 KURTZ (J.), supra note 1, at p.756.
tly used by arbitral tribunals while determining if  inves-
tors were in “like circumstances”.64 
Moreover, this analysis seems in fact necessary. In-
deed, when it was not used in the Occidental case, the 
result was inconvenient.65 The tribunal found exporters 
of  flowers and exporters of  oil as being in “like cir-
cumstances”. As a consequence, a VAT refund refused 
to oil exporters but provided to flower or seafood ex-
porters was found as being a “less favorable treatment” 
breaking NT obligation.66 
Having accepted the relevance of  a competitive 
analysis, it appears that it would not deprive GE of  their 
useful effect. Competition is part of  the analysis of  NT 
under the GATT and has always been applied with the 
existence of  the exceptions of  GATT Article XX. 
As a consequence, the inclusion of  GATT Article XX 
like exceptions imposes changes on the analysis of  NT. 
Legitimate policy objectives could no longer be taken 
into account, except in the restrictive way of  EC-Asbestos. 
Moreover, nationality may only be taken into account in 
the determination of  a “less favorable treatment” but this 
possibility appears to be very unsatisfactory in a IIL con-
text. Therefore, the assessment of  the existence of  “like 
circumstances” would be mainly based on a competitive 
analysis, which could have major side effects. 
4. fIndIng A wAY to fIll the gApIng 
loophole for legItImAte polIcY obJectIves
A mainly competitive analysis of  “like circumstan-
ces” with the only use of  the GE to exclude the liability 
of  the State would be a dramatic path for the right to 
regulate of  the host State (A). However, an interpreta-
tion using the causation or impossibility analysis found 
in Dominican Republic – Cigarettes report of  the AB could 
reduce these negative effects (B).
64 Archer Daniel Midlands v. Mexico, supra note 11, at paras. 196-8 ; 
Corn Products v. Mexico, supra note 11, at para.120 ; ADF v. United 
States, supra note 11, at para. 155 ; Feldman v. Mexico, supra note 11, at 
para. 171 ; SD Myers v. Canada, supra note 11, at para. 250.
65 Occidental v. Ecuador, Award, July 1, 2004, ICSID Reports, vol.12, 
p.156, at paras. 173-6.
66 KURTZ J. supra note 1 at pp.763-5.
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4.1. The Mere Use of General Exceptions: A 
Possibly Dramatic Path for the Right to Regulate
With the only use of  a competitive analysis, the host 
state would have to treat all investors in the same eco-
nomic sector similarly. But, contrary to products, a very 
broad range of  regulations are applied to investors and 
investments. Products imported in a State are affected 
by regulations on the entry of  products, taxation of  the-
se products, and regulations on the products. It goes 
differently for investments. For instance, if  an invest-
ment is an enterprise incorporated in the host State it 
is submitted to every law applied to enterprises in the 
country, like labor law, tax law or corporation law. Of-
ten, these laws provide for different ways to treat the 
enterprises in order to pursue legitimate policy objecti-
ves, what could amount to a violation of  the NT obli-
gation under IIL. 
If  we take the example of  a law that applies a tax rate 
of  15% of  the revenues on enterprises which annual 
revenue is less important than $ 1,000,000 (hereinafter 
referred to as case 1) and a 30% rate to enterprises with 
annual revenue more important than $ 1,000,000 (herei-
nafter referred to as case 2). In the event that two en-
terprises are in the same economic sector, one national 
in case 1 and a foreign in case 2, these two enterprises, 
being competitors, would be found as being “in like cir-
cumstances”. But, the foreign one would get a 30% tax 
rate whereas the national would get a 15 % tax rate, 
which would amount to a “less favorable treatment” of  
the foreign investment and, consequently, to a breach 
of  NT. 
Therefore, in order to avoid being found in breach 
of  NT, host States will have to organize their law regi-
mes by economic sector as differences based on other 
criteria may result in a potential breach of  NT, except 
for the laws pursuing one of  the objectives of  the GE 
and respecting the conditions of  “necessity” and of  the 
‘chapeau’ of  Article XX like exceptions. 
In fact, the list of  objectives which a measure can 
pursue under GATT Article XX is a very restrictive one, 
as it allows measures: 
• To protect public morals 
• to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health; 
• relating to the importations or exportations 
of  gold or silver; 
• to secure compliance with laws or regula-
tions which are not inconsistent with the 
provisions of  this Agreement, including 
those relating to customs enforcement, 
the enforcement of  monopolies operated 
under paragraph 4 of  Article II and Arti-
cle XVII, the protection of  patents, trade 
marks and copyrights, and the prevention 
of  deceptive practices; 
• measures relating to the products of  prison 
labour; 
• imposed for the protection of  national trea-
sures of  artistic, historic or archaeological 
value; 
• the conservation of  exhaustible natural re-
sources if  such measures are made effec-
tive in conjunction with restrictions on do-
mestic production or consumption; 
• undertaken in pursuance of  obligations 
under any intergovernmental commodity 
agreement which conforms to criteria sub-
mitted to the CONTRACTING PARTIES 
and not disapproved by them or which is 
itself  so submitted and not so disapproved;
• restrictions on exports of  domestic materi-
als necessary to ensure essential quantities 
of  such materials to a domestic processing 
industry during periods when the domestic 
price of  such materials is held below the 
world price as part of  a governmental sta-
bilization plan; Provided that such restric-
tions shall not operate to increase the ex-
ports of  or the protection afforded to such 
domestic industry, and shall not depart 
from the provisions of  this Agreement re-
lating to non-discrimination;67
This list of  objectives is indeed much more stringent 
than the objectives that have been taken into account in 
several arbitral decisions.68 Even in the frame of  ITL, 
it has been considered restrictive, although it is used to 
excuse differences of  treatment for a much smaller ran-
67 This list is extracted from GATT Artcle XX.
68 See the examples listed supra p.6.
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ge of  measures.69 However, this article could be inter-
preted a bit more broadly than in the context of  trade 
law. Indeed, in ITL, the difference of  treatment allowed 
under Article XX must be based on the product. That 
is to say, the product itself  must present a health risk 
or endanger the preservation of  natural resources, ex-
cluding health risk or consequences on animal life, for 
example, due to production methods.70 In the context 
of  IIL, NT is imposed to “establishment, acquisition, 
expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale 
or other disposition of  investments”.71 Therefore, a di-
fference of  treatment could be justified not only becau-
se of  an health or environmental risk created by the end 
product but because the way the investment operates 
presents more risks for environment or health than a 
national investor in “like circumstances”. This would 
be, for instance, the case of  two investors in “like cir-
cumstances” creating similar products, if  one presents 
risks of  contamination of  water supplies and not the 
other, due to the way the two factories proceed. 
However, even if  a measure were justified in the li-
ght of  the objectives listed in the GE, it would still have 
to meet the requirements of  ‘necessity’ and the ones of  
the ‘chapeau’.
Some treaties have extensively incorporated GATT 
article XX.72 Conversely, others have adapted it. In the 
first case, measures must be “relating to” some of  the 
objectives and necessary to protect others. Contrary to 
this, Canadian FIPA model has imposed a requirement 
of  necessity for all the purposes of  the GE, even when 
the GATT only requires these to “relate to” the objecti-
ve.73 The interpretation of  “relating to” might be quite 
close to the requirement used by ISDS tribunals of  a 
“reasonable nexus”74 or “reasonable manner”75 or “ra-
tional justification”76.
It is different for the necessity test. It has been first 
interpreted by the AB in the Korea – Beef  case. It has 
required, on its face, a cost-benefits analysis, demanding “a 
69 ZHOU W., ‘US – Clove Cigarettes and US – Tuna II (Mexico): 
Implications for the Role of  Regulatory Purpose under Article III:4 
of  the GATT’ (2012) 15: 4 Journal of  International Economic Law 
1075, at 1112.
70 HUDEC R.E., supra note 16, at p.624.
71 NAFTA, supra note 10, article 1105.
72 Final CETA text, supra note 20, article 28.3 (2). 
73 Canada FIPA Model (2004), supra note 20, article 10.
74 Pope and Talbot v. Canada, supra note 11, at para.78.
75 SD Myers v. Canada, supra note 11, at para.246.
76 Feldman v. Mexico, supra note 11, at para. 170. 
process of  weighing and balancing a series of  factors 
which prominently include the contribution made by the 
compliance measure to the enforcement of  the law or 
regulation at issue, the importance of  the common in-
terests or values protected by that law or regulation, and 
the accompanying impact of  the law or regulation on im-
ports or exports”.77 At the same time, it recognised that 
the State was free to fix its own level of  protection.78 Re-
gan points the contradiction of  these two requirements 
and explains that the real test is not a mere ‘cost-benefits’ 
analysis, which would require to weigh the purpose of  
the measure with its consequences on trade, allowing the 
tribunal to reject the very purpose of  the measure.79 
According to Regan, the analysis is rather different.80 
The panel accepts the level of  protection required by 
the State but searches for alternative possibilities to 
achieve the same objective with less restriction on tra-
de, except if  the administrative costs of  the alternatives 
appears to be unreasonable for the State.81 Regan notes 
that this approach has been consistently used by the AB 
in the cases of  EC – Asbestos82, US – Gambling83 and 
Dominican Republic – Cigarettes84.85
As a consequence, any measure by the host State 
resulting in a difference of  treatment between a natio-
nal and a foreign investor in the same economic sector 
would have to be no more restrictive than necessary to 
achieve its objective in order not to constitute a breach 
of  NT. 
In addition, a measure would also have to meet the 
requirements of  the ‘chapeau’ of  GATT article XX. 
Therefore, it must “not [be] applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of  arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same con-
ditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international 
trade”. This has been interpreted in the Brazil – Retreated 
77 Korea – Beef, supra note 18, at para. 164.
78 Ibid., at para 176. 
79 REGAN D.H., ‘The Meaning of  ‘Necessary’ in GATT Arti-
cle XX and GATS Article XIV : the myth of  cost-benefit balanc-
ing’,2007, vol.6, n°3, World Trade Review, p.347 at p.348.
80 Ibid. at pp.348-9.
81 Korea – Beef, supra note 18, at paras. 180-2.
82 EC – Asbestos, supra note 14,
83 Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the 
Cross-Border Supply of  Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/
AB/R, adopted April 20, 2005.
84 Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic – Measures Affect-
ing the Importation and Internal Sales of  Cigarettes, WT/DS302/AB/R, 
adopted May 19, 2005.
85 REGAN D.H., supra note 72, at p.350.
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Tyres case.86 In this case, Brazil imposed a ban on the im-
portation of  retreated tyres to prevent health risks. The 
measure presented two exceptions, one allowing the 
importation of  these tyres from other countries of  the 
MERCOSUR, to comply with MERCOSUR rules, ano-
ther allowing Brazilians to retreat imported used tyres.87 
The AB found that these exceptions were “means of  
arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination” because the 
rationales given for the exceptions were not related to 
the general objective of  the measure.88 As a consequen-
ce, any exception to the measure that would treat diffe-
rently investors would have to be justified by the very 
purpose of  the measure. 
This could be very problematic if  this path was 
followed in the context of  investments as laws taken by 
the host state often take into account various objectives. 
For example, tax laws often receive exceptions in order 
to serve as an incentive for economic actors to adopt 
certain behaviors, making it difficult to be consistent 
with the conditions imposed by the ‘chapeau’.
As a consequence, for a measure to be consistent 
with the NT clause, it would have to treat all investors 
of  the same economic sector similarly. If  these were 
treated differently, the difference would have to be ne-
cessary to pursue one of  the objectives listed in the GE, 
meaning that no alternative less restrictive for the fo-
reign investor would be reasonably available. Moreover, 
any exception or derogation to the measure should be 
justified by a rationale relating to the objective of  the 
measure itself. Hence, it would be very difficult for a 
measure by the host state to stick to the line of  com-
pliance with NT provision. Moreover, in ITL a State 
found in breach of  NT only has to ensure compliance 
in the future, while in IIL, the State would be liable to 
provide a reparation to the investor, thus making it im-
possible to experiment measures to find if  they are con-
sistent with the GE and NT. This may result in more 
regulatory chill.89 However, ISDS tribunal could use the 
causation or impossibility analysis in order to make the 
interpretation of  NT more protective of  the Right to 
regulate of  the State.
86 Panel Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of  Retreated Tyres 
(hereinafter Brazil – Retreated Tyres), WT/DS332/R, Appellate Body 
Report, WT/DS332/AB/R, adopted December 17, 2007.
87 ZHOU W., supra note 62, at p.1098.
88 Brazil – Retreated Tyres, Appellate Body Report, supra note 80.
89 DIMASCIO N. and PAUWELYN J., supra note 1, at p.81.
4.2. Using Causation or Impossibility Analysis: 
Relying on Dominican Republic – Cigarettes
According to the reasoning exposed in the previous 
development, the example of  the differential tax be-
tween small and bigger businesses given earlier would 
be in breach of  NT. The purpose, to adapt the amount 
of  taxes to the capacity to contribute of  each enterprise, 
is not covered by the list of  purposes of  GATT Article 
XX.
However, by relying on the findings of  the AB in 
Dominican Republic - Cigarettes90, it could be possible to 
develop an analysis that would avoid some of  the draw-
backs caused by the mere use of  GE.
In this case, Dominican Republic imposed a bond 
of  the same amount to every producers and importers 
of  cigarettes. Among other arguments to challenge the 
measure on the ground of  NT. Honduras advanced that 
National Producers had more shares of  the market than 
foreign importers, making the per-unit amount of  the 
bond heavier for imported cigarettes than for nationally 
produced, and resulting in a “less favorable treatment” 
of  imported cigarettes.91 The AB rejected this allegation 
on the basis that the difference in treatment was only 
“explained by the fact that the importer of  Honduran 
cigarettes has a smaller market share than two domestic 
producers”.92
Zhou suggest two interpretations of  this finding.93 
First, this could be seen as a causation analysis implying 
that “a case of  less favorable treatment would be establi-
shed as long as a contested measure itself  is found to be 
responsible for an alleged disparate impact”, excluding 
less favorable treatment merely due to the facts of  the 
case.94 Using this analysis could exclude the breach of  
NT by the taxation measure given as an example above. 
Indeed, the differential treatment is not created by the 
measure itself  but by the fact that the foreign investor 
has more important revenues than the national one. 
Second, it could be seen as an impossibility analysis. 
It would mean that a difference of  treatment would be 
contrary to NT in the event that the foreign investor 
could never get the better treatment accorded to the 
90 Dominican Republic – Cigarettes, supra note 78.
91 Ibid., at para. 96.
92 Ibid.
93 ZHOU W., supra note 62, at pp.1087-8.
94 Ibid. 
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national one.95 This would also exclude the breach in 
the former example. The foreign investor could get 
the same treatment as the national investor as soon 
as its annual revenue would be less important than 
$1,000,000. Conversely, the national investor could get 
the same treatment as the foreign investor if  its revenue 
rose above the same bar. This could be a way to exclude 
breaches of  NT when the State applies general mea-
sures providing differential treatments on the basis of  
factual differences as soon as the factual conditions of  
the investor are susceptible to evolve, making it to be 
treated differently. 
However, there are some reasons to think that this 
test would possibly not be applicable to the example 
given and to IIL more generally.  
First, in the Dominican Republic – Cigarettes case, the 
measure of  the State did not create any category and 
the difference of  treatment was merely due to a factual 
difference. Therefore, the test established by the AB 
could be not applicable to measures creating different 
categories, even if  these are based on mere factual di-
fferences. 
Second, the analysis is based on the ‘so as to afford 
protection to domestic production’ provision of  GATT 
Article III:1 as interpreted by the AB in the EC-Asbes-
tos96 and the necessity of  a detrimental effect on the 
conditions of  competition of  the national investor in 
Korea – Beef  cases97.98 The conclusion of  the analysis 
was that, as the difference of  treatment resulted from 
factual differences, the difference of  the bond per-unit 
did “not depend on the foreign origin of  the impor-
ted cigarettes”.99 However, as explained above,100 NT in 
IIL does not provide such “so as to afford protection” 
language and therefore does not require the difference 
of  treatment to be based on nationality, what could ex-
clude the use of  the causation or impossibility analysis, 
which purpose is to demonstrate that the difference of  
treatment is not linked to the nationality of  the investor. 
Therefore, the mere use of  GE may have major 
detrimental effects in the frame of  IIL, reducing dras-
tically the right to regulate of  the State without being 
95 Ibid., at 1088.
96 EC – Asbestos, supra note 14, at para. 100.
97 Korea – Beef, supra note 18, at para. 137.
98 Dominican Republic – Cigarettes, supra note 78, at paras. 91-92, 96. 
99 Ibid., at para. 96.
100 See supra The Incertitude on the Remaining Role of  National-
ity, p.7.
found liable for a breach of  NT, conversely to its objec-
tive. However, there may be other ways to draft IIAs to 
pursue the same objective, without the risk to experien-
ce the detrimental effects described above. 
5. fIndIng better wAYs to AchIeve the sAme 
obJectIve
In order to find better ways to achieve the same ob-
jective than the inclusion of  GATT Article XX excep-
tions in IIAs, there is to determine exactly this objective 
(A). Two possible ways are to use the analysis developed 
under the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT Agreement)101 (B) or to codify some selected ar-
bitral awards (C). 
5.1. The Objective of GATT Article XX like 
Exceptions: Balancing Regulatory and Investor’s 
Interests
The inclusion of  GE serves a couple of  objectives:102 
First, to provide written exceptions so as to avoid that 
an arbitral tribunal would only base a breach of  NT 
clause on the fact that a foreign investor has received 
“less favorable treatment” than a national “in like cir-
cumstances” without taking into account any legitimate 
policy objective that would justify the measure.103
A second objective is also to establish precisely the 
balance between the interests of  the investor and the 
need to pursue legitimate policy objective through the 
requirements of  necessity and the conditions of  the 
‘chapeau’, avoiding the risk that legitimate policy objec-
tives would be accepted too broadly.
But, as described above, the use of  GE may be far 
too stringent for a State’s right to regulate, and therefore 
detrimental to the first objective. Nonetheless, the esta-
blishment of  this balance between the right to regulate 
of  the States and the protection of  investors is a subject 
of  major importance and must preferably be determi-
101 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120 
(referred to as TBT Agreement).
102 NEWCOMBE A., supra note 21, at p.268.
103 For example, the tribunal in Corn Products v. Mexico, supra note 
11, considered that it did not have to search for a legitimate policy 
objective that could have justified the difference of  treatment., at 
para. 142. 
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ned in the treaties than by arbitrators.104 It is therefore 
necessary to find other ways to achieve this objective.
5.2. Analysis of “less favorable treatment” under 
TBT Agreement
A first way to protect a broad range of  public poli-
cy objectives while balancing the interests of  both the 
investors and the host State could be to import in BITs 
the NT clause of  TBT article 2: 
“2.1. Members shall ensure that in respect of  
technical regulations, products imported from 
the territory of  any Member shall be accorded 
treatment no less favourable than that accorded to 
like products of  national origin and to like products 
originating in any other country.
1.2.  Members shall ensure that technical regulations 
are not prepared, adopted or applied with a view to 
or with the effect of  creating unnecessary obstacles 
to international trade.  For this purpose, technical 
regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than 
necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking 
account of  the risks non-fulfilment would create.”
This provision has been interpreted by the AB in 
the cases US – Clove Cigarettes105 and US – Tuna II106. 
In the US-Clove Cigarettes case, the AB differentiated the 
analysis of  NT under the TBT agreement from the one 
developed under GATT. 
It first established that the analysis of  “like pro-
ducts” only serves to determine “the scope of  products 
that should be compared to establish whether less fa-
vorable treatment is being accorded to imported pro-
ducts”, therefore not changing the analysis from the 
one developed under GATT Article III:4.107
Nevertheless, the AB, relying on the linkage between 
article 2.1 and article 2.2 and the preamble of  the TBT 
agreement considered that a legitimate objective should 
be taken into account to determine if  the imported pro-
duct has received less favorable treatment. It considered 
that article 2.2 accords the possibility to create obstacles 
to international trade if  these are “not […] more tra-
de restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate policy 
104 DIEBOLD N., supra note 1, at p. 15.
105 Appellate Body Report, United States – Mesures Affecting the Pro-
duction and Sale of  Clove Cigarettes (hereinafter US – Clove Cigarettes), 
WT/DS406/AB/R, Adopted April 24, 2012.
106 Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Concerning the 
Importation, Marketing and Sale of  Tuna and Tuna Products (hereinafter 
US-Tuna 2), WT/DS361/AB/R, Adopted June 13, 2012.
107 US – Clove Cigarettes, supra note 98, at para. 116.
objective”. As a consequence, if  the analysis of  diffe-
rential treatment did not take into account the legiti-
mate objective and forbid any less favorable treatment, 
article 2.2 would be deprived of  its effet utile.108 Also 
taking into account the preamble of  the agreement109 
and the context given by other WTO Agreements110, the 
AB concluded that the less favorable treatment under 
TBT should be considered through a two-stage analysis. 
First, there is to search for a less favorable treatment of  
the group of  imported products, compared to the one 
accorded to the group of  national products. Second, 
there is to “analyze whether the detrimental impact on 
imports stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory 
distinction rather than reflecting discrimination against 
the group of  imported products”.111 In the event that 
legitimate objective would justify the measure, it would 
have to respect the conditions of  article 2.2. The same 
analysis was followed by the AB in US – Tuna II.112 
In its reports, the AB has also interpreted the mea-
ning of  the necessity requirement of  Article 2.2. It has 
retained an interpretation consistent with the one de-
veloped under GATT,113 considering the liability would 
be excluded if  a less-restrictive, reasonably available al-
ternative that would make an equivalent contribution to 
the objective, as described above.114 Moreover, it stated 
that the burden of  proof  is on the claimant, who has 
to bring a prima facie proof  that the measure is not ne-
cessary to achieve its objective by proposing an alterna-
tive consistent with the criteria detailed above115. If  the 
claimant succeeds to bring that proof, the burden shifts 
to the respondent to prove that the measure is necessa-
ry, by demonstrating “for example, that the alternative 
measure identified by the complainant is not, in fact, 
“reasonably available”, is not less trade restrictive, or 
does not make an equivalent contribution to the achie-
vement of  the relevant legitimate objective.”116
Using this treaty language while drafting NT provi-
sions of  IIAs would allow to meet the two objectives 
that have driven States to use GATT Article XX like ex-
ceptions without experiencing most of  the side effects 
108 Ibid., at para. 171.
109 Ibid., at paras. 172-3.
110 Ibid., at paras. 176-81.
111 Ibid., at para. 182.
112 US – Tuna II, supra note 99, at paras. 215-6.
113 Ibid., at para. 322.
114 See supra, p.16.
115 US – Tuna II, supra note 99, at para. 323.
116 Ibid.
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described in this paper. 
First, it would require for the tribunals to consider 
legitimate policy objectives justifying differences in 
treatment using an open list of  examples. This would 
make possible to take into account more policy objec-
tives than GATT Article XX exceptions. Second, the 
requirement of  “necessity” would create more balance 
between the right to regulate and the investors’ interests 
than the simple requirement of  a “reasonable nexus to 
legitimate policy objective”.117
The requirement of  necessity has been accepted by 
the States that have added GE to their IIAs as it is also a 
part of  the analysis of  GATT Article XX. Nevertheless, 
it seems to be an unsatisfying requirement for both the 
investor and the host State.118 
As described above119, States have different adminis-
trations with different competences and knowledge, im-
portant resources and have access to information from 
International organizations. Therefore, it is manageable 
for them to bring the proof  that a measure is not neces-
sary to achieve the legitimate objective by providing an 
example of  a less restrictive, reasonably available mea-
sure that makes the same contribution to the objective. 
This task would be much more difficult for an investor. 
Indeed, investors are private actors whose daily activity 
is not to draft regulations. They do not have the ad-
ministrations’ expertise to settle if  a proposed measure 
achieves the same objective, or the information provi-
ded by International organizations. Moreover, they do 
not have statistic services and data in order to establish 
that the cost of  a proposed measure would not be so 
high that it would not make it reasonably available. As a 
consequence, they would have to hire a lot of  experts, 
making the cost of  an arbitration much higher, and 
could still lack information that only States can obtain. 
This would be also problematic for the State. In-
deed, the requirement of  “necessity” provides a strin-
gent standard of  review to the arbitrators. Every regu-
lation that would differentiate between a national and a 
foreign investor would have to be no more restrictive 
than what is necessary to achieve its legitimate objective. 
This is problematic as it would be required for the very 
broad range of  rules applied to investors. Moreover, if  
117 Pope and Talbot v. Canada, supra note 12, at para. 78.
118 DIEBOLD N., supra note 1, at p. 22; LEVESQUE C., supra 
note 23, at p.143.
119 See supra p.10
a State failed to prove the measure is indeed necessary, it 
would be found directly liable for a reparation.
As a consequence, if  this possibility would permit 
the first objective described above to be achieved, the 
way to respond to the second one would be very unsa-
tisfying for both the host State and the investor. Thus, it 
is preferable to find a third way.
5.3. Codification of Selected Arbitral Awards
A way to achieve the objective of  the inclusion of  
GATT Article XX like exceptions is to codify relevant 
arbitral awards while drafting the treaty, in order to 
make sure that the tribunals take into account the legiti-
mate objectives justifying differences of  treatment. This 
is the choice that has been made in the Trans – Pacific 
Partnership Agreement (TPP) through the endnote 14, 
enlightening the interpretation of  Article 9.4 (NT): 
“For greater certainty, whether treatment is accor-
ded in “like circumstances” under Article 9.4 (Natio-
nal Treatment) or Article 9.5 (Most-Favoured-Nation 
Treatment) depends on the totality of  the circumstan-
ces, including whether the relevant treatment distingui-
shes between investors or investments on the basis of  
legitimate public welfare objectives”. 120
This solution achieves the first objective described 
earlier without side effects, as it has been developed in 
an IIL context, taking into account its specificities. 
To answer to the second objective, it would be pos-
sible to modify the outcome of  decisions by incorpora-
ting a more stringent standard of  review than the requi-
rement of  a “reasonable nexus” but less restrictive than 
“necessity”. This could be, for instance, manifest dis-
proportion. Thus, the State would have the possibility 
to treat a foreign investor less favorably if  it is justified 
by a legitimate objective, except if  the consequences 
on the foreign investor are manifestly disproportiona-
te compared to the objective. It is possible to take the 
example of  a measure forbidding totally a production 
method used by a foreign investor in order to prevent a 
health risk whereas the one used by a national investor 
120 Trans-Pacific Partnership, legally verified text, released Janu-
ary 26, 2016, online: New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade < 
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/about-us/who-we-are/treaty-mak-
ing-process/trans-pacific-partnership-tpp/text-of-the-trans-pacific-
partnership/ >, footnote 14.
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would still be accepted. It would be manifestly dispro-
portionate if  minor adaptations of  the process would 
have permitted to protect health in the same way. 
Therefore, the State would have much more leeway 
to regulate without being found responsible and the in-
vestor would have less difficulty to bring a proof, due to 
the obviousness of  such a breach. 
6. fInAl conclusIons
GE have been incorporated in a limited, but growing, 
number of  IIAs in order to set a necessary balance be-
tween regulatory purposes and protection of  foreign in-
vestors. They do so by establishing an exhaustive list of  
legitimate objectives and the nexus between a measure 
and the said objectives. However, incorporating such 
exceptions may drive ISDS tribunals to distance them-
selves from what has become a dominant practice. In-
deed, GE are operative exceptions. Hence, the principle 
or effectiveness in treaty interpretation may require that 
these exceptions are not deprived of  their useful effect 
by the interpretation of  NT. 
If  this path was followed by ISDS tribunals, it could 
have detrimental effects for the right to regulate of  the 
States. First, it would no longer be possible to take into 
account legitimate policy objectives in the determina-
tion of  “like circumstances”. Second, nationality could 
only be taken into account whether through a “dispro-
portionate disadvantage test” that is ill-adapted to the 
IIL context or to identify a comparator. Therefore, NT 
would be interpreted as forbidding any less favorable 
treatment imposed to a foreign investor compared to a 
national one in the same economic sector. 
Then, GE would be the only possibility to excuse a 
breach of  NT to take into account a regulatory purpose. 
This solution presents two detrimental effects. First, the 
purposes listed at GATT Article XX are two restrictive 
in the IIL context. Second, the requirement of  “neces-
sity” and of  the chapeau are too stringent. Moreover, 
no convenient interpretation pathway may allow to ex-
clude these detrimental effects.
Thus, the most convenient way to achieve the objec-
tive followed by the integration of  GE in IIAs without 
the risk of  such detrimental effects is to develop a treaty 
wording that would rely on solutions developed in the 
IIL framework. This could take the form of  a clause 
inviting to take into account the regulatory purpose in 
the determination of  “like circumstances”. While draf-
ting this clause, the parties would have the possibility to 
detail the understanding of  a regulatory purpose and 
establish a nexus between the measure and the objective 
more adapted to IIL than the “necessity” one. 
More broadly, this example invites to question the 
appropriateness of  importing solutions developed in 
ITL in IIL, due to the core differences between these 
two fields of  International economic law.
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